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Where Did Human Equality Come From?

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You believe — almost without having to be told — that every human being is of equal worth. The newborn and the dying, the genius and the person with a profound disability, the celebrated and the destitute: whatever separates them, you assume that something makes them equal, and that this something outranks everything else about them. Strip away rank, usefulness, intelligence and strength, and a bare human worth remains, the same in each. We call the denial of this “dehumanising,” which is to say we treat it not as a mistake of fact but as a kind of blasphemy.

Here is the surprise. That conviction is not obvious, and it is not natural. It is a value, not a measurement — because as a measurement it is plainly false. Human beings are radically unequal in every capacity you can name: in strength, health, intellect, beauty, longevity, usefulness to others. Nothing you can weigh, count or test comes out equal. “Equal worth” is a claim about what a person is, laid over a mass of evidence that they are not equal in what they can do. So where did it come from? For most of recorded history almost no one believed it, and the civilisations that gave the West its philosophy believed something close to its opposite.

The world that ran the other way

The ancient Mediterranean was not merely hierarchical in the way every society is hierarchical, with some people richer or more powerful than others. It was hierarchical in its account of being. Some human beings were held to be higher and others lower not by accident of circumstance but by nature, from birth, in their very constitution. Aristotle states it without embarrassment, because to him it was simply description: “For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.”1 This is not a defence of a controversial thesis. It is a man pointing at what he takes to be the furniture of the universe.

On this view, justice did not mean the levelling of persons; it meant the opposite. The intellectual historian Larry Siedentop puts the point flatly: “the core of ancient thinking” was “the assumption of natural inequality.”2 Greeks and Romans looked at the human race and instinctively saw a pyramid — men above women, free above enslaved, Greek above barbarian — and to give each his due, which is what justice was, meant keeping each in the tier nature had assigned him. Modern justice equalises; ancient justice ranked. They are nearly opposite ideas wearing the same word.

Individual voices did dissent, and honesty requires naming them: some Stoics and Roman jurists reasoned toward a common humanity. Aristotle himself argues for natural slavery because others in his own day were calling slavery a mere human convention, contrary to nature; Seneca could write that a slave is a fellow human being; the jurist Ulpian recorded the principle that, by natural law, all are born equal.3 But — and this is the decisive fact — none of it became a movement, a law, or a settled conviction that the weak have a claim on the strong simply by being human. Seneca kept his slaves; Ulpian's maxim sat inside a legal code that enforced slavery. The dissent lived as an idea and never became anything more.

What the old stories took for granted

To feel how strange the equal-worth intuition is, look at what the ancient world's origin stories assumed a human being was for. In the Babylonian creation epic Enuma Elish, humanity is manufactured from the blood of a slain god, the traitor Kingu, and the purpose is stated in the making of us: mankind is charged with the service of the gods, so that the gods may be at ease.4 The older Mesopotamian poem Atrahasis is blunter still. The lesser gods have gone on strike, refusing the endless labour of digging the world's rivers and canals; so humanity is created to take the work over — “let man bear the load of the gods.”5 We are, in these stories, the gods' unpaid workforce, brought into existence for our usefulness and made from the blood of a murder.

That is not a slightly grimmer version of human dignity. It is a different kind of thing altogether. It is an anthropology in which a person's worth just is their utility, in which some exist to labour so that others may be at leisure — which is exactly the tiered world Aristotle described, now written into the cosmos at its origin. Against that background you can begin to measure the size of the reversal that was coming.

Four hundred crosses

What did that hierarchy cost an actual person? Consider one episode, reported by the Roman historian Tacitus. In AD 61 a senator named Pedanius Secundus, the prefect of the city of Rome, was murdered by one of his own slaves. Ancient custom prescribed the remedy: when a master was killed under his own roof, the entire household of slaves — in this case around four hundred men, women and children, nearly all of them innocent — was to be executed together. A crowd gathered in the streets to stop it, and the Senate debated. A minority recoiled. But the jurist Gaius Cassius carried the day, arguing that the old severity must stand, that so mixed a mass of slaves could be held down “only by terror,” and that — in the sentence that lays the whole logic bare — “in every great precedent there is some injustice, which is compensated, as against individuals, by the public advantage.”6 The four hundred went to their deaths.

Read Cassius's principle slowly, because it is the precise inversion of the modern intuition. The individual is real but negligible; the collective is what counts; and an injustice done to particular persons is simply the price of the system, absorbed by the general good. A world that could reason like that, in its Senate, about hundreds of innocents, was not a world with a weak commitment to human equality. It was a world organised around the opposite commitment, and doing so in good conscience.

The claim that broke it

Into that world came a conviction with a different shape. Its root is not first of all Christian but Jewish: the opening page of Genesis says that God made humanity — not the king, not the free man, not the Greek, but humanity, male and female alike — in his own image. “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.”7 The claim is that worth is not earned or measured but conferred, bestowed on every human being by the Maker, and therefore identical in each regardless of capacity or rank. That doctrine developed in Jewish scripture and Jewish interpretation, and it stands on its own feet; the church did not invent it. What the church did was carry it into the Gentile world at scale, and weld it to a second claim that struck the ancient ear as insane.

The second claim was about the cross. Crucifixion was Rome's instrument for un-personing a human being: the death reserved for slaves and rebels, engineered to strip its victim of dignity in public.8 And Christians said that God himself, in the person of the Son, had been executed“God was executed” — in what sense Christians say itIs sayingThe one who suffered and died is a divine person, God the Son. Scripture speaks this way: it was “the Lord of glory” who was crucified (1 Corinthians 2:8), and God bought the church “with his own blood” (Acts 20:28).Not sayingNot that the divine nature suffered or died, and not that the Father suffered. Christ is one person in two natures, fully God and fully man; he died in his true human nature, and God did not cease to be God. by that very method. Paul knew how it sounded — he called the message of a crucified Messiah “a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles.”9 But follow the logic. The empire's supreme act of contempt, its way of declaring a human being worthless, had become the object of worship. A civilisation that came to adore a tortured slave as God could no longer coherently hold that the humiliated are contemptible — whatever it went on doing in practice.

Inside the church, the same reversal was stated as membership. “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”10 The categories that ranked the ancient world — ethnicity, legal status, sex — are named precisely in order to be relativised: they do not determine worth before God. It is this trajectory that the philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff has argued is the real seedbed of the modern idea of natural, inherent human rights. Rights, on his account, are grounded in a worth that is bestowed — the equal, unearned dignity of a creature loved by God — and he traces that idea back through Hebrew and Christian scripture, arguing that the moral resources of Greek and Roman antiquity could not, by themselves, have produced it.11

The honest atheist witness

You do not have to be a believer to accept the diagnosis. Some of its sharpest statements come from writers with no religious stake at all. The historian Yuval Noah Harari, an atheist, puts it with admirable candour in Sapiens. Examine the American Declaration of Independence's ringing claim that “all men are created equal,” he says, and biology gives it no support whatever: “there are no such things as rights in biology,” and “Homo sapiens has no natural rights, just as spiders, hyenas and chimpanzees have no natural rights.” Equality, in his account, is a story we tell — a conviction inherited, he notes, from a Christian framework — and not a fact you can find in the world.12

Harari draws a bleak conclusion from this that Christians do not share; the point of quoting him is not his despair but his honesty about the premise. He confirms, from the far side of the aisle, exactly what this essay has been arguing: equal human worth is not written into nature and cannot be read off from it. It is a value that had to come from somewhere. That it feels self-evident to a modern Westerner is not evidence that it is natural — it is evidence of how completely one particular inheritance has soaked into the air we breathe.13

What this shows, and what it doesn't

It is worth being exact about the size of the claim, because the temptation is to make it do more work than it can. This is a genealogy of a conviction, not a proof of a creed. That the equal-worth intuition has deep Christian and Jewish roots does not, by itself, show that Christianity is true; a belief can have a noble pedigree and still be false, and the case for the faith's truth rests elsewhere — on the resurrection and the historical and philosophical arguments made throughout this library, not on its social fruit.14 And the church has been a repeated traitor to its own doctrine: it blessed slaveholding, tolerated caste, and looked away from cruelties its own scriptures condemned. Those failures are real, and no account of where the standard came from lessens them. Nor did the conviction travel a straight or purely churchly road: much of its modern legal and political articulation came through the Enlightenment, sometimes phrased against the church and in a deliberately secular idiom of natural rights. The claim here is narrower, and about origins rather than custody — that the load-bearing premise those later thinkers inherited and secularised, that every person carries an equal and unearned worth, entered the Western imagination through the image of God and had no other stable home in the ancient world.

But notice the shape of that very sentence. We can call the church's betrayals betrayals only because there was a standard to betray — and it was, in no small part, the church's own standard that the reformers turned back against it. Many of the abolitionists who indicted Christian slaveholders did so from Genesis and the image of God, turning the church's own text against it — even as other Christians marshalled Scripture to defend slavery, in what became a genuine crisis of biblical interpretation. The campaigners against caste and cruelty reached for the same conviction that every person bears an equal, unearned worth. The ideal judged its own failures and armed its own critics.15 That is not a small thing to have given the world.

So when you find yourself certain — as you should be — that a trafficked child and a titan of industry are of exactly equal worth, that the strong owe something to the weak simply because they are human, you are not stating a fact of biology or a deliverance of pure reason. You are standing at the end of a long and improbable history, most of which ran the other way. The conviction is not the air; it was won, against the grain of the world, and it is worth knowing whose it was.

Footnotes

  1. Aristotle, Politics 1.5 (1254a21–24), trans. Benjamin Jowett (public domain). The line sits inside Aristotle's sustained defence of “natural” slavery in Politics 1.3–7 (1253b–1255b). The Greek verb rendered “marked out” (diestěke) carries the sense of being separated or distinguished from birth.
  2. Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (London: Penguin, 2015), p. 51: “the core of ancient thinking” was “the assumption of natural inequality,” so that Greeks and Romans “instinctively saw a hierarchy or pyramid” rather than a level playing field. Siedentop is a historian of political thought, not a theologian, and his book traces the equal individual through medieval canon law. That larger thesis — that Christianity is where the equal individual was first thought — is itself debated among historians of political thought; the narrower point drawn on here, that ancient thought assumed natural inequality, is not seriously in dispute.
  3. Aristotle, Politics 1.3 (1253b20–23), where he takes up natural slavery precisely because others “maintain that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature”; Seneca, Epistle 47 (“they are slaves” — “no, they are fellow human beings”); Ulpian, in Justinian's Digest 50.17.32, that “so far as the natural law is concerned, all human beings are equal.” These voices existed; none became a movement. On the precision here, this library's essay on the legacy of Christianity develops the same point.
  4. Enuma Elish, Tablet VI, in Stephanie Dalley, Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh, and Others, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Marduk, through the god Ea, fashions humankind from the blood of the slain god Kingu and lays the toil of the gods upon humanity so that the gods may rest (Tablet VI, in the region of lines 5–8 and 33–34; in Dalley's rendering the work of the gods is imposed on man so that the gods are at leisure).
  5. Atrahasis, Tablet I, in W. G. Lambert and A. R. Millard, Atra-ḫasīs: The Babylonian Story of the Flood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), and in Dalley, Myths from Mesopotamia. After the lesser gods rebel against their forced labour, humanity is created to take it over: “let man bear the load of the gods.”
  6. Tacitus, Annals 14.42–45 (the murder of Pedanius Secundus, AD 61, and the Senate's debate). The quoted maxim is 14.44, rendered here after A. J. Church and W. J. Brodribb: “in every great precedent there is some injustice, which is compensated, as against individuals, by the public advantage” (Latin: habet aliquid ex iniquo omne magnum exemplum, quod contra singulos utilitate publica rependitur). Cassius also argues that so mixed a household of slaves can be held down “only by terror.” The figure of roughly four hundred household slaves is Tacitus's.
  7. Genesis 1:26–27 (ESV): “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness… So God created man in his own image… male and female he created them.” The doctrine that every human being bears the divine image is Jewish in origin and development; cf. the rabbinic reflection preserved in Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:5, that a single human was created so that no one could say “my father is greater than yours.” This essay does not claim the doctrine as a Christian invention.
  8. That crucifixion was pre-eminently the “slave's punishment” (servile supplicium), designed to disgrace as much as to kill, is the standard picture in the Roman sources: Cicero calls it “the most cruel and disgusting penalty” and one whose very name should be kept far from a Roman citizen (Against Verres 2.5.165–170; Pro Rabirio 5.16), and Tacitus treats it as the death fit for slaves. See Martin Hengel, Crucifixion in the Ancient World and the Folly of the Message of the Cross (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977).
  9. 1 Corinthians 1:23. The clause fenced on this page — that God, in the person of the Son, was executed — is the orthodox communication of properties (communicatio idiomatum): what is proper to Christ's humanity is truly predicated of the one divine person, so that Scripture can say “the Lord of glory” was crucified (1 Corinthians 2:8) and God purchased the church “with his own blood” (Acts 20:28), without implying that the divine nature suffered or that the Father was crucified.
  10. Galatians 3:28 (ESV). The passage relativises ethnicity, legal status and sex as determinants of worth “in Christ,” not as social facts; it is a claim about standing before God, and it names those three axes precisely because they were the axes on which the ancient world ranked persons.
  11. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), which argues that inherent natural rights rest on a worth bestowed on each person by God, traces the intuition through Hebrew and Christian scripture, and contends that Greek and Roman eudaimonism could not supply a framework for such rights. Wolterstorff's is a contested thesis, defended and disputed within the philosophy of rights; it is cited here as the most developed scholarly statement of the grounding, not as a settled result.
  12. Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (London: Harvill Secker, 2014; orig. Hebrew 2011): “there are no such things as rights in biology”; “Homo sapiens has no natural rights, just as spiders, hyenas and chimpanzees have no natural rights.” Harari's own conclusion — that human equality and rights are useful fictions with no ground in reality — is one this essay rejects; he is quoted only for the premise he shares with the argument, that equal worth is not a fact of nature.
  13. Glen Scrivener, The Air We Breathe: How We All Came to Believe in Freedom, Kindness, Progress, and Equality (Epsom: The Good Book Company, 2022), whose title supplies the image used here: the values feel like atmosphere because we have never been without them. A popular-level work; its historical claims should be checked against specialist scholarship, and it is cited for its framing.
  14. For the case that Christianity is true, see the resurrection cluster in this library — above all the essay on the early creed of 1 Corinthians 15 — and the natural-theology essays including the moral argument. That a conviction has Christian roots is a claim about history, not about God, and is offered as no evidence of the faith's truth.
  15. The point is developed at length in this library's essay on who ended slavery, which sets out both the church's record of complicity in slavery and the fact that abolition was argued, against Christian slaveholders, from creation in the image of God and the biblical condemnation of the man-stealer (Exodus 21:16; 1 Timothy 1:10). On the American case as a crisis of biblical interpretation, see Mark A. Noll, The Civil War as a Theological Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

Bibliography & further reading

Frequently asked questions

Isn't human equality just obvious — something any decent person can see?

It feels obvious, and that feeling is itself the thing to explain. As a measurement, equal worth is plainly false: humans differ in strength, health, intellect and usefulness in every way you can test. “Equal worth” is a value laid over that inequality, not a fact read off from it — which is exactly why the atheist historian Yuval Noah Harari can say, honestly, that “there are no such things as rights in biology.” For most of history most societies did not believe it, and the ancient world often believed the reverse: Aristotle held that some people are “marked out” for rule and others for subjection from birth. A conviction that had to be won against the grain of the world is not the default setting of the human mind.

Doesn't this argument prove Christianity is true?

No, and it isn't offered as proof. This is a genealogy of a conviction, not a demonstration of a creed. A belief can have deep and honourable roots and still be false; that equal human worth has Christian and Jewish origins tells you where the standard came from, not whether God exists. The case for the faith's truth rests on other grounds — the resurrection and the arguments made elsewhere in this library. And the church has often betrayed this very doctrine, which is precisely why its own standard could be turned back against it by the reformers who cited Genesis against Christian slaveholders.

Didn't the Greeks and Romans already believe in a common humanity?

A few voices reached toward it — Seneca could call a slave a fellow human being, and the jurist Ulpian recorded that by natural law all are born equal. Those voices were real, and this essay names them. But two things are true of them: they graded worth by rational capacity rather than treating it as equal and bestowed, and, decisively, they never became a movement, a law, or a settled conviction. Seneca kept his slaves; Ulpian's maxim sat inside a code that enforced slavery. The idea that every human being has an equal, inviolable worth simply by being human entered Western law and sentiment largely through a different route.

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